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ABSTRACT
The objective of this research is to explore how the Three Lines of Defense
Model (“the Model”) can most effectively be leveraged by banking professionals
to foster trustworthiness in the banking industry. The banking industry’s
trustworthiness—or untrustworthiness—has the power to positively or adversely
impact the lives of individuals, and the power to enhance or diminish global
economic stability (Dia, 2011; Egan, 2017; Financial Stability Board, 2010). This
research presents an overview of the literature on the Model, and findings
gathered from a confidential online survey, reflecting insights from 43 banking
professionals with first-hand experience working within the Model. When
implemented strategically by dedicated banking professionals, the Three Lines of
Defense Model serves as a highly effective framework for fostering
trustworthiness in the banking industry.
Keywords: Three Lines of Defense Model, banking industry, risk culture

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Kimberly
Torres, and my reader, Dr. Jean-Marc Choukroun. I am grateful to my
extraordinary colleagues, who navigate the Three Lines of Defense Model with
me every day, and who consistently demonstrate their commitment to fostering
trustworthiness in the banking industry. I would like to thank the survey
respondents who provided such insightful feedback on their first-hand
experiences working within the Model. This research is dedicated to my late
grandmother, Charlotte Perl Kruman, who encouraged and inspired me to
embrace a life full of intellectual curiosity.

iv

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1
2

Page
Survey Questions
Survey Respondents

27
30

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1
2
3

Page
Trustworthiness: Ethical Behavior and Efficiency
Interactions Across Lines: Challenge, Communication, Roles
Leaders: Understanding and Commitment

vi

36
40
42

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ABSTRACT

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

LIST OF TABLES

v

LIST OF FIGURES

vi

CHAPTER
1 Introduction

1

2 An Overview of the Literature

11

3 Methodology

20

4 Data Analysis and Findings

29

5 Conclusion

47

REFERENCES

52

APPENDIX

58

vii

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The objective of this research is to explore how the Three Lines of
Defense Model (“the Model”) can most effectively be leveraged by banking
professionals to foster trustworthiness in the banking industry. The industry’s
trustworthiness—or untrustworthiness—has the power to positively or adversely
impact the lives of individuals, and the power to enhance or diminish global
economic stability (Dia, 2011; Egan, 2017; Financial Stability Board, 2010).
When implemented strategically by dedicated banking professionals, the Three
Lines of Defense Model serves as a highly effective framework for fostering
trustworthiness in the banking industry. I am personally drawn to this research
because of my role in the Three Lines of Defense Model within a Global
Systemically Important Bank (“G-SIB”).
Roadmap
In this introduction, I define “trustworthiness,” “Three Lines of Defense
Model,” and “G-SIB,” while establishing an outline of my key research questions.
In chapter two, An Overview of the Literature, I outline key findings from the
literature on the Three Lines of Defense Model, including academic literature,
industry white papers, and publications by industry regulators and standardsetters. In chapter three, Methodology, I detail my approach to designing a
confidential online survey to gather first-hand insights from banking professionals
with experience working within the Model. In chapter four, Data Analysis and
Findings, I outline insights derived from quantitative and qualitative survey data.
In chapter five, Conclusion, I aggregate key takeaways from this research and
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provide recommendations on how the Model can most effectively be leveraged
by banking professionals to foster trustworthiness in the banking industry.
Trustworthiness
Within my research, I define “trustworthiness” as the presence of two
essential characteristics: integrity and competence. I derived this definition of
“trustworthiness” from “Uncertainty, Trust, and the Regulation of the Banking
Industry” by Enzo Dia, published in the International Review of Economics in
2011. “Integrity” is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “the quality of being
honest and having strong moral principles that you refuse to change.” (Stated in
a straightforward manner: A bank that operates with “integrity” isn’t intentionally,
lying, cheating, or stealing.) “Competence” is defined by the Cambridge
Dictionary as the “ability to do something well.” Dia (2011) emphasizes that
trustworthiness in the banking industry “does not simply mean the expectation of
a low probability of being cheated, but a more far-reaching appreciation of the
capabilities and knowledge of other cooperating agents” (p. 214). It’s not
adequate for a bank to operate with integrity: The bank must also possess the
competence to protect its customers from harm, such as loss of assets entrusted
to the bank. Dia (2011) provides the example of “a very honest banker” who
lacks the ability to successfully identify which potential borrowers it is reasonable
to lend to, and therefore “cannot guarantee the safety that depositors require” (p.
217). Such a banker may have the highest integrity, however trustworthiness
can only be achieved when integrity is paired with competence (Dia, 2011).
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Research Questions
The objective of my research is to answer the following key questions:
•

How can the Three Lines of Defense Model most effectively be
leveraged by banking professionals to foster trustworthiness in the
banking industry?

•

What are the most common challenges banking professionals
encounter with the Model, and how can those challenges most
effectively be navigated?

•

What is the Model’s greatest strength, and how could that strength
be fostered?

•

What is the Model’s greatest weakness, and how could that
weaknesses be mitigated?

The next section provides an overview of the Three Lines of Defense Model.
Three Lines of Defense Model
While the Three Lines of Defense Model is ubiquitous in 21st century
banking, “there is no consensus on how the three lines of defense concept
entered the risk domain, with some theories suggesting military or sporting
origins” (Davies & Zhivitskaya, 2018, p. 37). Davies and Zhivitskaya (2018) trace
one of the earliest references to the Model back to a UK banking regulator, the
Financial Service Authority, in 2003 (p. 37). Davies and Zhivitskaya (2018) define
the objective of the three lines as defending “against the risk of corporate failure”
and the adverse impact such failure would have on a bank’s stakeholders (p. 40).
A bank’s stakeholders include clients, investors, vendors, and employees, all of
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whom would be adversely impacted by a bank’s untrustworthy practices—
however, the scope of adverse impact would not stop with the bank’s immediate
stakeholders. Each stakeholder has their own network of stakeholders—and
those stakeholders have their own stakeholders, and so on—all of whom would
feel the far-reaching ripple effects of a bank’s untrustworthy practices. The Three
Lines of Defense Model is regarded as an effective framework for fostering
trustworthiness in the banking industry by standard-setters and regulators
including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Financial
Stability Board (FSB), Federal Reserve Bank (“the Fed”), and Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (BCBS, 2011; FSB, 2015; Held, 2018; OCC,
2014). Professionals within each line of the Three Lines of Defense Model have a
distinct role to play in driving trustworthiness in the banking industry.
First Line: Business Management
First line of defense professionals work within the “risk-taking and
revenue-generating” area of the bank that provides services to clients (Hu &
Denizkurdu, 2020, p. 216). Their direct engagement in day-to-day business
activities positions these professionals to be the first ones to identify practices
that are lacking in trustworthiness. By identifying problems early and “keep[ing]
problems small, [the first line] contributes materially to the trustworthiness of…the
financial system and therefore promotes financial stability” (Held, 2018, para. 7).
An example of a problem that first line professionals could identify early—and
prevent from becoming a large problem—is a process that lacks clarity around
responsibilities. If the individuals responsible for the execution of a process are
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not clear on where their responsibilities end and the next team member’s
responsibilities begin, there is a high risk of such a process breaking down.
Diligent first line professionals could identify the risk posed by such lack of clarity,
drive the establishment of clear responsibilities, and therefore mitigate the risk of
a process break-down. In 2018, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York hosted a
First Line of Defense Summit, where Michael Held (Executive Vice President of
the Legal Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) characterized first
line professionals as “not just a first line of defense for [their] organization…[but]
the first line of defense against significant risks to the financial system” (para. 7).
When first line professionals identify and remediate small problems, they prevent
such problems from growing into large ones that could adversely impact the
bank’s stakeholders and—depending upon the magnitude of the problem—
adversely impact the global economy. First line professionals are not on their
own as they pursue their mandate to identify and mitigate potentially “significant
risks to the financial system” (Held, 2018, para. 7). First line professionals work in
partnership with their second line counterparts.
Second Line: Risk Management and Compliance
Second line of defense professionals provide the first line with guidance on
ensuring trustworthy business practices, and may identify untrustworthy practices
the first line has overlooked. An example of an untrustworthy practice reflecting a
diminished level of “competence” would be a process with inadequate controls,
which is prone to errors that could adversely impact customers. An example of
an untrustworthy practice reflecting a diminished level of “integrity” would be the
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practice of employees intentionally misleading customers. Cocheo (2014)
identifies the second line as being “responsible for checking what is going on in
the [first line]” and evaluating the bank’s risk landscape “to get a strong sense of
the overall level of risk actually taken, and how it jibes with the risk appetite
established by the board” (p. 35). The second line also engages in “setting
standards related to…compliance with applicable laws, regulatory requirements,
policies, procedures, and standards of ethical conduct” (Hoes & Gehlert, 2020, p.
160). As a bank’s driver of revenue, the first line may be inclined to engage in
decision-making that is “skewed towards revenue generation” (Ciocîrlan, 2017, p.
392). The success of many first line professionals is measured by their ability to
consistently generate revenue by engaging in activities such as securing
relationships with new clients and expanding the scope of services provided to
existing clients. Such professionals are often rewarded for successful revenue
generation with bonuses, positive performance reviews, and opportunities for
career advancement. With such strong incentives to drive revenue, first line
professionals may develop tunnel-vision with a focus on revenue generation,
while potentially developing a blind-spot for risks associated with these revenuegenerating activities. The second line must therefore act as a counterbalance,
ensuring that risks inherent to revenue-generating activities are thoroughly
evaluated (Ciocîrlan, 2017). While the first line and second line may successfully
identify and remediate untrustworthy practices, there is always a possibility that
some untrustworthy practices may go unidentified—which is where the third line
comes in.
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Third Line: Internal Audit
Third line of defense professionals examine practices across the first line and
second line to ensure the identification and remediation of untrustworthy
practices. The key responsibilities of internal audits are “to ensure that the first
two lines are operating effectively and advise how they could be improved”
(Bruce, 2017, para. 10). In order to ensure an effective third line of defense, a
bank’s board of directors and executive officers must engage in all possible
efforts to ensure the third line is “independent and free from any conflict of
interest” that may bias their evaluation of the first line and second line (Ciocîrlan,
2017, p. 394). One method for fostering independence in the third line is
establishing a reporting structure where third line professionals report to
executives that do not have any first line or second line responsibilities. Such a
reporting structure provides third line professionals with a chain of command that
does not have conflicting interests, or incentives to favor the interests of one line
over another. If third line professionals have ties that are too strong to the first
line or second line, the third line may become the proverbial fox watching the
henhouse. By engaging in an independent review of the first line and second line,
the third line serves as the “underpinning of the whole [three lines of defense]
framework” (Delgado, 2019, p. 5). Cocheo (2014) compares internal audit
professionals to goalies: “[An internal auditor] is the last person to make sure the
ball doesn’t go into the net” (Cocheo, 2014, p. 35). If the first line and second line
fail to identify and address issues of untrustworthiness, the third line has the final
opportunity to handle such issues within the bank. If the third line fails to identify
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and address issues of untrustworthiness, then the fourth line enters the picture,
and significant consequences—such as fines and reputational damage—may
follow.
Fourth Line: Regulators and External Auditors
While the Model is comprised of three lines of defense within a bank, “a
fourth line of defense may exist by way of external auditors and/or regulators”
(Arndorfer & Minto, 2015, p. 9). External auditors and regulators address
untrustworthy practices that have gone unidentified and/or unaddressed by the
three lines of defense. While the efforts of the fourth line are “building on the
work of the other three [lines],” banks “should be designing a [three lines of
defense] system which is robust and complete” and not relying on the fourth line
to identify their shortcomings (Davies & Zhivitskaya, 2018, p. 39). Adverse
regulatory findings may receive widespread media coverage and regulators may
impose hundreds of millions—or even billions—of dollars in fines on a bank for
engaging in untrustworthy practices (Benoit, 2020; Hagel & Beckerman, 2020).
This “pressure” resulting from regulators’ ability to impose “measurable monetary
damage as well as reputational damage” provides industry leaders with a strong
incentive to ensure their implementation of the Three Lines of Defense Model is
highly effective (Hoes & Gehlert, 2020, p. 159).
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBS)
While trustworthiness is vital for all banks, there is a small subset of banks
whose trustworthiness—or lack thereof—carries significant global consequences:
G-SIBs. The FSB, an “international body that monitors and makes
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recommendations about the global financial system,” defines G-SIBs as
“institutions of such size, market importance, and global interconnectedness that
their distress or failure would cause…adverse economic consequences across a
range of countries” (FSB, 2020, para. 1; FSB, 2010, p. 2). Regulators across the
globe hold G-SIBs to heightened standards of trustworthiness, “commensurate
with the system-wide expected losses that their failure would produce” (FSB,
2010, p. 2). The FSB published the first list of G-SIBs in 2011 and continues to
publish a revised list each November in partnership with banking authorities
across the globe, and in partnership with the BCBS, a “global standard setter” for
banking regulation with the “purpose of enhancing financial stability” (BCBS,
2018, para. 1; FSB, 2021, p. 1). As of November 2021, 30 banks were
designated as G-SIBs by the FSB (FSB, 2021, p. 1). The enduring
trustworthiness of G-SIBs is essential to maintaining global economic stability.
Too Big To Fail
When a government must choose between allowing a G-SIB to fail, or
intervening to save a G-SIB, intervention is often viewed as the lesser of the
evils. G-SIBs are often referred to as “too big to fail” because their failure
“threatens to cause such significant disruption to the…economy that these
potential costs are judged as too severe to bear, leading to government
intervention to prevent the failure” (Dudley, 2013, para. 1). While government
intervention may prevent a G-SIB’s failure, such intervention yields an
unintended consequence: moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when an individual
or entity is willing to engage in high-risk behavior because “they do not bear the
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full consequences” of such behavior (Kotowitz, 1989, p. 207). In the case of GSIBs, their failure could be so catastrophic to the global economy that
governments will intervene to prevent such failure, providing G-SIBs with an
“implicit guarantee at the taxpayers’ expense” (Dudley, 2013, para. 1). Grunwald
(2009) states that such implicit guarantees create moral hazard by sending a
message that “too big to fail financial firms” will be rescued by governments
regardless of how egregious their untrustworthy practices may be (p. 44). By
identifying G-SIBs and holding them to heightened standards, the desired
outcome is to drive increased accountability and trustworthiness, while
minimizing moral hazard. In the next chapter, I explore themes that stand out in
the literature on the Three Lines of Defense Model.
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CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In the literature on the Three Lines of Defense Model, three prominent
themes emerge: (a) culture; (b) costs vs. benefits; and (c) division of
responsibilities. A bank’s culture will drive the nature of its employees’ behavior,
impacting the trustworthiness of the bank and ultimately enhancing or diminishing
the trustworthiness of the banking industry as a whole (Stiroh, 2018). While
investing in the Three Lines of Defense Model may be costly, it is arguably far
more costly to fail to invest in fostering trustworthiness. Regulators in the fourth
line of defense may fine banks hundreds of millions—or even billions—of dollars
for engaging in untrustworthy practices (Benoit, 2020; Hagel & Beckerman,
2020; Kelly, 2020). There is no one-size-fits-all approach to establishing the
optimal division of responsibilities across the three lines of defense. A bank’s
leaders must tailor the Model to align to their bank’s unique characteristics, and
divide responsibilities across lines accordingly (BCBS, 2011, p. 4).
Culture
Kevin Stiroh (Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution
Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) has spoken at
numerous conferences underscoring the importance of organizational culture in
driving trustworthiness in the banking industry. As a senior leader in the fourth
line of defense, Stiroh derives highly valuable insights on culture from his
extensive first-hand experiences. At the 2018 Annual Culture and Conduct
Forum for the Financial Services Industry, Stiroh defines a bank’s culture as “the
shared set of norms that influences decision-making and is evidenced through
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[employee] behavior” which is ultimately “driven by a multifaceted set of factors
including incentives, cues from peers, observations about leaders, and formal
policies and procedures” (p. 3). At the 2020 Risk USA Conference, Stiroh
leverages the term “cultural capital” to refer to the defining characteristics of a
bank’s culture, and explores the contrasting behaviors that prevail in banks with
low levels of cultural capital and their counterparts with high levels (p. 1). Banks
with low levels of cultural capital are characterized by employees’ willingness to
engage in activities that could adversely impact stakeholders, including illegal
activities (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1). In such organizations, “groupthink” is widespread
and employees who raise concerns about high-risk behavior are routinely
ignored by senior leaders (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1). The effective implementation of the
Three Lines of Defense Model is significantly challenging in an environment
where trustworthiness is not valued. Due to an inability to effectively implement
the Model, untrustworthy and/or illegal activities typically go undetected by all
three lines, “only coming to light when discovered by [the fourth line]” (Stiroh,
2020, p. 1). Examples of such untrustworthy and/or illegal activities are explored
later in this chapter. Organizations with low levels of cultural capital suffer
reputational damage themselves, while also diminishing overall “trustworthiness
of the industry over time” (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1). Conversely, organizations with high
levels of cultural capital are characterized by employees’ unwillingness to engage
in excessive risk-taking, and a commitment to behaving lawfully (Stiroh, 2020, p.
1). In such organizations, employees are encouraged to escalate risk-related
concerns to senior leaders and are respected for doing so (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1).
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Banks with high levels of cultural capital earn reputations as trustworthy
institutions and foster overall trustworthiness in the banking industry.
The BCBS (2011) asserts that “a strong risk culture and good
communication among the three lines of defense are important characteristics of
good operational risk governance” (p. 4). In order to effectively examine how the
Three Lines of Defense Model fosters trustworthiness in the banking industry, it
is beneficial to further explore the meaning of “risk governance” and identify
defining characteristics of distinct “risk cultures.” Risk theorist, Ortwin Renn,
defines “risk governance” across industries as “a complex web of actors, rules,
conventions, processes, and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk
information is collected, analyzed, and communicated” and ultimately how such
information is leveraged by management to make decisions (2008, p. 9). Within
the context of the Model, risk governance is the way in which professionals
across the three lines identify risk, and the actions they take in response to risk
identification. Risk governance may be approached in materially different ways,
depending upon an organization’s prevailing risk culture.
Agarwal and Kallapur (2018) explore three distinct risk cultures that
frequently emerge across industries: (a) cognitive risk culture; (b) defensive risk
culture; and (c) resource-based risk culture. Agarwal and Kallapur (2018) identify
the defining characteristic of cognitive risk culture as a focus on “improving the
understanding of risk and resolving the problems by addressing their root cause”
(p. 330). The objective of defensive risk culture is not necessarily fostering
trustworthy behavior, but avoiding the consequences of failing to do so (Agarwal
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& Kallapur, 2018). Defensive risk culture often leads to “sub-optimal or even
wrong decisions for the sake of preventing lawsuits and blame” (Agarwal &
Kallapur, 2018, p. 330). While cognitive risk culture focuses on root cause
analysis, and defensive risk culture focuses on blame prevention, resourcebased risk culture focuses on fostering resiliency and adaptability in employees.
Proponents of resource-based risk culture assert that risks are too numerous to
proactively identify and manage, so organizations must “develop the capabilities
to adapt successfully” when faced with unanticipated challenges (Agarwal &
Kallapur, 2018, p. 330). An organization’s risk culture will drive how employees
respond to a wide variety of unanticipated challenges ranging from natural
disasters to cybersecurity breaches. Depending upon the prevailing risk culture
at a given bank, the way in which the Three Lines of Defense Model fosters
trustworthiness will differ significantly: Cognitive risk cultures foster
trustworthiness by leveraging root-cause analysis; Defensive risk cultures deflect
blame at any cost, with no sincere interest in fostering trustworthiness; Resourcebased risk cultures foster trustworthiness by fostering adaptability in employees
(Agarwal & Kallapur, 2018).
Cost vs. Benefit
In the opening remarks of the 2019 International Bankers Forum, industry
leaders were encouraged to view spending on the Three Lines of Defense Model
not as an “additional cost,” but rather as a “long-term investment” (Delgado,
2019, p. 6). While there may be significant costs associated with the successful
implementation and ongoing maintenance of the Three Lines of Defense
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Model—such as hiring, training, and maintaining high-performing teams across
the three lines—there are significant costs associated with failing to do so. In
October 2020, the Fed and the OCC fined Citigroup $400 million, due to
shortcomings in the bank’s systems designed to “identify risk and protect
customer data” (Benoit, 2020, para. 8). One month later, the OCC fined
JPMorgan Chase $250 million “over deficiencies in internal
controls…[and]…deficient risk management practices” (Hagel & Beckerman,
2020, paras. 1-3). While the fines imposed on Citigroup and JPMorgan are
significant, they are overshadowed by the $3 billion in fines imposed on Wells
Fargo by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange
Commission in 2020 for the bank’s “fraudulent sales practices” (Kelly, 2020,
paras. 1-2). Wells Fargo executives pressured first line professionals to drive
revenue by achieving “unrealistic sales goals” (Kelly, 2020, para. 6). To achieve
these unattainable goals, thousands of first line professionals “created millions of
savings and checking accounts for customers without [the customers’]
knowledge or approval” and customers were subsequently charged fees for
these fraudulently opened accounts (Egan, 2017, para. 10; Kelly, 2020, para. 3).
Wells Fargo also confirmed that thousands of auto loan borrowers “may have
defaulted on their car loans or had their vehicles repossessed” due to the bank
charging unnecessary insurance costs without borrowers’ knowledge or consent
(Egan, 2017, para. 2). The consequences for one such borrower, Samir Hanef,
illustrate the far-reaching ripple effects of Wells Fargo’s untrustworthy practices.
When Hanef’s car was repossessed because he did not pay the insurance
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costs—which he was charged without his knowledge or consent—he was unable
to commute to his job as a social worker, resulting in his patients failing to
receive much-needed services (Egan, 2017). By paying the car repossession fee
at his own expense, Hanef was able to get his car back, however his credit score
had been so adversely impacted by his bank’s actions that he was no longer
eligible to refinance his mortgage (Egan, 2017). As a customer, Hanef was
directly impacted by his bank’s untrustworthy practices, and those who rely on
Hanef—namely his patients and his family—were also impacted (Egan, 2017). If
Wells Fargo had allocated sufficient resources to the implementation and
maintenance of strong risk management practices, perhaps Henef and
thousands like him would not have been adversely impacted, and perhaps Wells
Fargo would not have been fined $3 billion. Spending on risk management is
inevitable, and banking industry leaders must pick their poison: proactively spend
on implementing and maintaining strong risk management practices, or reactively
spend on paying regulators’ fines and remediating broken processes.
Division of Responsibilities
While the general structure of the Model is well-established in the banking
industry, there is a “tricky balance to be achieved” when dividing responsibilities
between the three lines (Hoes & Gehlert, 2020, p. 159). The OCC acknowledges
that excessively rigid implementation of the Model can result in establishing
overly formal divisions between responsibilities across lines, rather than taking
into account the “the mix of functions performed” within each line (OCC, 2014, p.
54528). During a First Line of Defense Summit hosted by the Federal Reserve
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Bank of New York in 2018, Michael Held (Executive Vice President of the Legal
Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) addressed the “potential
dangers” of implementing the Model too “rigidly” with “excessive formalism”
(para. 9). At the summit, Held stressed that the division of responsibilities
between the lines should be driven by “independence and expertise” and not by
creating barriers between the lines, or unnecessary “silos” (Held, 2018, para. 13).
Excessively rigid implementation of the Model can inhibit effective
communication between professionals across lines, ultimately diminishing the
efficacy of the Model by stifling the kind of collaboration that is essential for
identifying and addressing untrustworthy practices.
To maximize the efficacy of the Three Lines of Defense Model, the
nuances of the Model’s implementation must be tailored to the unique needs of a
given bank. The BCBS (2011) recognizes there is no one-size-fits-all approach to
the optimal implementation of the Model and “depending on the bank’s nature,
size and complexity, and the risk profile of a bank’s activities, the degree of
formality of how these three lines of defense are implemented will vary” (p. 3). If
the Model is implemented in a way that is properly aligned to the unique needs of
a bank, there should be “no gaps in coverage or unnecessary duplications” and
the Model should serve to establish a “clear understanding of unique roles and
responsibilities with regard to risk and control” (Hu & Denizkurdu, 2020, p. 215).
However, if the Model is implemented in a way that is not well-suited to a bank’s
circumstances, it has the “potential to diffuse responsibilities for risk in a way
which could reduce accountability rather than enhance it” (Davies & Zhivitskaya,
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2018, p. 41). Even if the Model is implemented in an optimal manner for a bank
at a specific point in time, the Model’s implementation will require ongoing reevaluations and adjustments. Hu and Denizkurdu (2020) assert that “a large
international bank is a live organism with a continuously changing risk profile” (p.
220). A bank’s implementation of the Model is not a one-time endeavor: The
Model’s implementation must continually evolve to align with the bank’s everchanging risk landscape.
Davies and Zhivitskaya (2018) explore the challenge of establishing a
desirable proximity between the first line and the second line: not too close, but
not too far. Regulators strive “to ensure an appropriate degree of independence
for each line” and may view the second line as being too close to the first line to
maintain independence—or too far removed from the first line to maintain
effective ongoing engagement (Davies & Zhivitskaya, 2018, p. 39). There is no
silver bullet for establishing the optimal distance between the first line and the
second line, as each bank has its own unique landscape to navigate. Davies and
Zhivitskaya (2018) explore two distinct approaches for establishing an optimal
relationship between the first line and second line: (a) the partnership model; and
(b) the policy and policing model (p. 39). The partnership model is characterized
by a very close working relationship between the first line and second line, and
sometimes involves “embedding risk professionals in first line teams” (Sweeting,
2017, p. 9). While such close engagement is “harmonious and plausibly effective”
it may position the first and second lines a bit too close for regulators’ comfort,
and make it difficult for a bank to demonstrate that their second line is
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maintaining the independence necessary to provide “effective challenge” to first
line practices (Davies & Zhivitskaya, 2018, p. 39). Second line professionals who
are too closely engaged in the first line’s day-to-day activities may not be
optimally positioned to engage in objective evaluation of the first line. Their
familiarity with the intricacies of first line practices may diminish their ability to see
the forest for the trees, and critically analyze first line activities. Reporting lines
are also a significant concern: If second line professionals are embedded in the
first line, they may report to the same senior leaders as their first line
counterparts. Within such a reporting structure, second line professionals are
subordinate to the senior leaders whose practices they must objectively evaluate.
Without a chain of command that is fully independent from the first line, second
line professionals may find themselves unable to effectively escalate concerns
regarding first line practices. The policy and policing model is characterized by
placing a significant amount of distance between the first and second lines, with
the second line “setting risk management policies and then monitoring the extent
to which those policies are complied with” (Sweeting, 2017, p.9). Establishing the
second line as an “oversight function” for the first line rather than a partner has its
pros and cons: While the second line has a high degree of independence from
the first line, the second line no longer has active engagement in the day-to-day
activities of the first line, and the opportunities for dialogue that come with such
close proximity (Davies & Zhivitskaya, 2018, p. 39). The next chapter details my
process of designing and conducting a confidential online survey.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
I designed and conducted a confidential online survey to gather insights
from professionals with first-hand experience in the Three Lines of Defense
Model within the banking industry. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the
criteria for survey participation, my approach to recruiting survey respondents,
and my process of piloting the survey. I also detail the structure of the survey,
which includes Likert-type scale questions, multiple-choice questions, and openended questions.
Criteria for Participation and Recruitment
To be eligible for participation in the survey, respondents were required to
have experience in any role in the Three Lines of Defense Model within the
banking industry, including the fourth line of defense (i.e., regulators and external
auditors). Respondents could have experience at G-SIBs and/or non-G-SIBS, as
the survey is focused on the efficacy of the Model within the banking industry,
and not exclusively focused on a specific type of bank. I built the online survey in
the Qualtrics platform and collected responses between January 2021 and March
2021. I primarily recruited respondents on LinkedIn using snowball sampling, a
recruitment method that leverages “interpersonal relations” to conduct research
(Browne, 2005, p. 47). I chose to leverage LinkedIn as my primary platform for
recruitment, as LinkedIn is the most effective avenue for accessing my
professional social network. My posts on LinkedIn featured a recruitment flyer
and a recruitment script, which are reflected in the Appendix. In addition to
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LinkedIn, I recruited respondents through the University of Pennsylvania’s
Organizational Dynamics Listserv.
While snowball sampling enabled me to successfully recruit survey
respondents with the requisite professional background, there are drawbacks to
this sampling method. One drawback is that respondents often recruit other
respondents “who share similar characteristics, or the same outlook” (Etikan, et
al., 2015, p. 1). In this way, snowball sampling does not lend itself to achieving a
perfectly balanced pool of respondents. It would have been desirable for this
survey to reflect feedback from an equal number of respondents from each line
of defense, as well as an equal number of respondents from G-SIBs and
non-G-SIBs, however the population of survey respondents closely resembles
the population of my professional network: predominantly first line and second
line professionals within G-SIBs.
Survey Design
Before beginning respondent recruitment, I conducted a pilot survey with
two banking professionals: one professional had experience across all three lines
of defense, and one professional had experience exclusively in the first line. Both
pilot participants are part of my professional network, and I selected them to take
part in the pilot to provide me with their unique perspectives. Conducting a pilot
for research instruments, such as surveys or interviews, can serve as a valuable
method for “developing and testing the adequacy of research instruments” before
launching a study (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002, p. 34). The “validity” of a
survey is enhanced by gathering and acting upon feedback from pilot participants
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on a range of topics such as identifying “difficult or ambiguous questions” that
may require “re-word[ing]” to elicit the desired feedback from respondents (van
Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002, p. 35). Conducting a pilot may also serve as an
effective method for identifying and eliminating leading language. Researchers
may consciously or subconsciously hold a strong attachment to a specific survey
outcome and unintentionally design a research instrument with leading language
“that is sure to “confirm [their] desired result” (Kitchenham & Pfleeger, 2002, p.
20). Based on feedback I received from the pilot participants, I refined the
survey’s language to enhance the specificity and clarity of certain questions. One
Likert-type scale question was significantly enhanced by my incorporation of pilot
participant feedback: “Senior leaders in the banking industry demonstrate a
meaningful understanding of the Model.” My first draft of this question referred to
“organizations” demonstrating a meaningful understanding, rather than “senior
leaders.” My pilot participants helped me refine this question to specify whose
understanding of the Model I wanted respondents to evaluate.
My research protocols, including the survey, were approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Pennsylvania with “exempt”
status. The University of Pennsylvania IRB is a federally regulated entity, which
reviews biomedical and social behavioral research proposals in order to
“determine if the proposed research meets certain…criteria to protect the rights
and welfare of the human subjects” (University of Pennsylvania, n.d., para. 1).
“Exempt” status is granted to studies posing “minimal risks” to participants, such
as accidental disclosure of private information (Federal Register, 2017, p. 7260).
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In a study with “exempt” status, “the probability and magnitude of harm or
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine
physical or psychological examinations or tests” (Federal Register, 2017, p.
7260).
While the survey did not ask respondents to disclose any personally
identifying information—such as name, employer, or age—the survey’s openended questions provided respondents with the opportunity to share feedback in
free-form text fields. Any information gathered through open-ended questions
that could potentially be personally identifying in nature is not disclosed in my
research findings. Confidentiality was essential to ensuring respondents could
safely provide candid feedback on their experiences working within the Model. If
a respondent were to share feedback on a certain bank’s implementation of the
Model, and that feedback were to be disclosed in a personally identifying
manner, such disclosure could cause reputational damage to the respondent, the
bank, and myself as a researcher and banking industry professional.
Survey Structure
The 36-question survey takes approximately 20 minutes for a respondent
to complete and is constructed of Likert-type scale questions, multiple-choice
questions, and open-ended questions. A detailed overview of the survey is
reflected in Table 1 and the full survey is reflected in the Appendix. The survey
was designed to gather information regarding the respondents’ professional
background and their insights on the efficacy of the Three Lines of Defense
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Model. Insights on the Model’s efficacy were gathered in the form of qualitative
data (via open-ended questions) and quantitative data (via multiple-choice and
Likert-type scale questions). By collecting both qualitative and quantitative data,
researchers are positioned to leverage “the qualitative research to inform the
quantitative portion of research studies, and vice versa” (Onwuegbuzie & Leech,
2007, p. 383). Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) characterize researchers who use
both qualitative and quantitative methods as being “armed with a bifocal
lens…rather than a single lens” (p. 383). In this study, the qualitative data
provided me with valuable insights and context that informed my ability to
meaningfully interpret the quantitative data—and vice versa.
The survey includes seven Likert-type scale questions, each of which
presents the respondent with a statement regarding the Model’s efficacy and
provides six possible responses ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly
Disagree.” Likert-type scales provide survey respondents with a “range of
responses to a statement or series of statements” and are “useful in social
science and attitude research projects” (Croasmun & Ostrom, 2011, p. 19). In
this study, responses to the Likert-type scale questions provide a framework for
quantifiably measuring respondents’ sentiments regarding the efficacy of the
Model.
The survey includes 13 open-ended questions regarding the Model’s
efficacy, seven of which are directly tied to a Likert-type scale question and ask
the respondent to provide details on the first-hand experiences that informed
their response to the corresponding Likert-type scale question. Open-ended
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questions bring both significant advantages and significant challenges to the
research process. One of the greatest advantages of open-ended survey
questions is “discover[ing] the responses that individuals give spontaneously”
while “avoid[ing] the bias that may result from suggesting responses” (Reja et al.,
2003, p. 159). A significant challenge presented when conducting analysis on
open-ended survey answers is reviewing a large population of free-form
responses and “determining what is worth analyzing” (Vaughn & Turner, 2015, p.
50). Vaughn and Turner (2015) recommend that researchers can bring “focus to
the process of analyzing qualitative data” by “coding along themes and topics to
highlight priorities” (p. 50). I leveraged open codes and in vivo codes in the
process of analyzing respondents’ answers to open-ended survey questions.
Open codes are terms or short phrases established by the researcher to
“describe conceptually what the researcher believes is indicated by the data”
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 160). In vivo codes are not created by the
researcher, but are rather “the actual words of research participants” (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008, p. 65). I also engaged in axial coding, which is the process of
“relating minor concepts to broader level concepts” within research findings
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 193).
In response to the survey’s open-ended questions, respondents shared
detailed accounts of first-hand experiences that have shaped their views on the
Model’s efficacy. The content of these open-ended answers provided valuable
insights to my research, which would not have been gathered if I had constructed
the survey exclusively of multiple-choice and Likert-type scale questions. Survey
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respondents shared particularly valuable feedback on open-ended questions
regarding the Model’s greatest strength and greatest weakness. One respondent
identified the Model’s greatest strength as “holding people accountable” while
“providing oversight [and] challenge.” When providing feedback on the Model’s
greatest weakness the same respondent emphasized that ultimately, the Model
“is only as good as its people” across the three lines. Such insights would not
have been gathered if the survey had been constructed exclusively of multiplechoice and Likert-type scale questions. The recruitment flyer, recruitment script,
and full survey are reflected in the Appendix.
The survey questions focus on two topics: (a) professional background of
the respondent; and (b) efficacy of the Three Lines of Defense Model, based on
the respondents’ first-hand experience. The survey questions are structured in
three ways: (a) multiple choice; (b) open-ended; and (c) Likert-type scale. Table
1 provides an overview of how I leveraged these two topics and three question
structures to construct the 36-question survey.
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Table 1
Survey Questions

Bracketing
While analyzing qualitative survey data, I engaged in bracketing to ensure
my first-hand experiences within the Three Lines of Defense Model would not
influence my data interpretation. Tufford and Newman (2010) define bracketing
as “a method used in qualitative research to mitigate the potentially deleterious
effects of preconceptions that may taint the research process” (p. 50). Bracketing
requires a researcher to consciously identify their “vested interests, personal
experiences, cultural factors, assumptions, or hunches” that could impact their
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interpretation of research data (Fischer, 2009, p. 583). Moreover, bracketing is
an “ongoing practice” of “self-consciously and regularly check[ing] to see whether
one is imposing meanings on the data” (Fischer, 2009, p. 584). As I analyzed
open-ended feedback from respondents, I engaged in bracketing by leveraging
coding to quantify how frequently a certain theme was addressed by
respondents. This quantification provided me with a method for objectively
evaluating the prevalence of themes, rather than allowing myself to be drawn to
themes that mirror my experiences and reflect my beliefs.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In this chapter, I provide an overview of key findings that emerged from
the survey’s qualitative and quantitative data. Of the 58 respondents who
participated in the survey, I have included data from 43 respondents in my
analysis. I excluded 15 respondents for two key reasons: (a) They indicated they
did not have experience in the Three Lines of Defense Model within the banking
industry, or (b) They did not answer any questions regarding the Three Lines of
Defense Model’s efficacy—therefore providing no insights on the Model.
Respondents provided answers to questions regarding the Model in three parts:
(a) Seven six-point Likert-type scale questions, with answers ranging from
“Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree;” (b) Seven open-ended questions asking
respondents to share their first-hand experiences that informed their Likert-type
scale answers; and (c) Six open-ended questions asking for respondents
feedback on topics such as the Model’s greatest strength and greatest
weakness. A detailed overview of the survey is reflected in Table 1 and the full
survey is reflected in the Appendix.
Respondents’ Background: Three Lines of Defense
Across the 43 respondents included in my analysis, experience was
reported across all three lines of defense, as well as the fourth line. As reflected
in Table 2, first line experience was most prevalent among respondents, with 37
respondents (86%) reporting experience in the first line. Twenty-three
respondents (53%) reported experience in second line compliance, while fifteen
(35%) reported experience in second line risk. Thirteen respondents (30%)
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reported experience in the third line. Fewer respondents reported experience in
the fourth line of defense with seven (16%) reporting experience in external audit
and three (7%) reporting experience working for a banking regulator. Twenty-six
respondents (60%) reported experience in more than one line, while 17 (40%)
reported experience exclusively in one line.
Table 2
Survey Respondents
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Respondents’ Background: Banks
Across the 43 respondents included in my analysis, 36 respondents (84%)
reported they were employed by a bank at the time they participated in the
survey: Thirty-five respondents (81%) reported they were employed by a G-SIB;
one respondent (2%) reported they were employed by a non-G-SIB; seven
respondents (16%) did not specify the nature of their current employer.
Respondents indicated if they had previously been employed by G-SIBs
and/or by non-G-SIBs. In evaluating the answers to questions regarding previous
employers, I concluded there had been a disconnect between the intended
questions, and the answers provided by respondents. Thirty-five respondents
indicated they were employed by a G-SIB at the time of the survey. Of those 35
respondents, 22 reported they’d also had a G-SIB as a previous employer—
indicating they’d been employed by at least two G-SIBs. Of the 22 respondents
who indicated they’d been employed by at least two G-SIBs, only 12 reported
they’d been employed by more than one bank that had implemented the Model—
indicating that 10 respondents had been employed by G-SIBs that had not
implemented the Model. It is a banking industry standard for all G-SIBs to
implement the Model, so due to the nature of these responses, I concluded the
questions had not been understood as intended. I believe respondents
misunderstood the survey questions regarding previous employers because
these questions lacked clarity. While I received highly valuable feedback from the
two participants in my survey pilot, I may have benefited from engaging a larger
number of participants. Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2002) underscore the value
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of gathering feedback from pilot participants regarding “difficult or ambiguous
questions” that may require “re-word[ing]” (p. 35). Additional participants may
have identified the lack of clarity in the survey questions regarding previous
employers. I have omitted any quantitative analysis based on answers to
questions regarding previous employers, however I have included qualitative
free-form answers respondents provided comparing their experiences across
different employers.
Respondents shared their observations on key differences in the
implementation of the Three Lines of Defense Model across different banks
where they had been employed. Respondents who had professional experience
exclusively at G-SIBs indicated the implementation of the Model was “relatively
consistent” across the G-SIBs. Respondents who had experience at both G-SIBs
and non-G-SIBs reported more significant differences in the Model’s
implementation. One respondent who had been employed by a non-G-SIB,
indicated that the bank’s CEO “was not interested in the Three Lines of Defense
Model” due to being “extremely expense conscious” and “not interested in
spending money on such things.” Another respondent indicated that G-SIBs
require more “considerable levels of coordination, communication, and alignment
of resources” compared to their non-G-SIB counterparts. This respondent went
on to highlight that G-SIBs must navigate a complex international landscape, as
they are supervised by “multiple regulatory bodies across the globe,” while many
non-G-SIBs are supervised by regulators in one country. A respondent who was
employed by a G-SIB at the time of completing the survey, expressed that a key
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driver of G-SIBs’ rigorous implementation of the Model is their leaders’
heightened “sense of accountability” because of the far-reaching global impact of
G-SIBs’ actions. This respondent’s feedback aligns with sentiments expressed by
the FSB. The FSB defines G-SIBs as “institutions of such size, market
importance, and global interconnectedness that their distress or failure would
cause…adverse economic consequences across a range of countries” (FSB,
2010, p. 2). Due to G-SIBs’ “global interconnectedness,” regulators worldwide
hold G-SIBs to heightened standards “commensurate with the system-wide
expected losses that their failure would produce” (FSB, 2010, p. 2). The next
section explores respondents’ insights on the Model’s role in driving trustworthy
behavior and efficiency in the banking industry.
Trustworthiness: Ethical Behavior and Efficiency
Respondents provided their feedback on the following statement: “Overall,
the Model contributes to making the banking industry more trustworthy in terms
of ethical behavior (e.g., a culture with high ethical standards is established and
unethical behavior is minimized due to the Model).” Seventy-two percent of
respondents indicated they either “Strongly Agreed” (21%) or “Agreed” (51%)
with the statement. Additional details are reflected in Figure 1. Two key themes
that emerged in respondents’ feedback on this statement were the importance of
“culture” and the importance of “checks and balances.” One respondent who
“Strongly Agreed,” indicated that “ethical behavior is an element of culture, [and]
culture is driven by management/leadership.” This respondent’s feedback is
reminiscent of a quote attributed to the “founder of modern management,” Peter
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Drucker: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast” (Denning, S., 2014, para. 1; Engel,
J., 2018, para. 1). The survey respondent and Drucker both contend that
organizational culture will ultimately drive employee behavior. If an organization’s
culture is aligned to valuing trustworthiness, then the Three Lines of Defense
Model can serve as an effective framework for fostering trustworthiness. If an
organization’s culture does not value trustworthiness, implementation of the
Model—without a change in culture—will not foster trustworthiness. If an
organization’s culture is at odds with an organization’s strategy, there is no
contest: Culture will “eat” strategy every time (Engel, J., 2018, para. 1).
Respondents also underscored the importance of checks and balances, with one
respondent who “Agreed” stating that “having one line check on the other [line]
creates [the] opportunity to mitigate risk.” Another respondent who “Strongly
Agreed” stated that the “independence of the three lines…creates appropriate
checks and balances.” One respondent who “Somewhat Disagreed” indicated
that a lack of independence between the lines can undermine the intended
efficacy of checks and balances.
Respondents then shared their perspective on the following statement:
“Overall, the Model contributes to making the banking industry more trustworthy
in terms of functioning more efficiently (e.g., more effective controls are in place
and mistakes are minimized due to the Model).” Sixty-five percent of respondents
indicated they either “Strongly Agreed” (16%) or “Agreed” (49%) with the
statement. Additional details are reflected in Figure 1. Once again, the themes of
“culture” and the importance of “checks and balances” emerged in respondents’
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comments. One respondent who “Agreed” underscored the importance of
culture, stating that the Three Lines of Defense Model is not a “silver bullet” and
cannot be expected to be effective “without strong and ethical leadership.” Two
respondents who “Agreed” highlighted the importance of ensuring appropriate
checks and balances, especially on first line activities, with one respondent
underscoring the necessity for the other lines to check the “decision-making” of
first line employees who are responsible for “driving new or incremental
business.” Ciocîrlan (2017) asserts that first line employees, who are
accountable for driving revenue, may be inclined to engage in decision-making
that is focused solely on revenue generation, without fully considering the
broader risk landscape (p. 392). Ciocîrlan (2017) underscores the importance of
ensuring second line professionals engage in a thorough evaluation of risks
associated with first line revenue-generating activities.
One respondent who “Disagreed” also focused on the importance of
engaging in checks on the first line. However, this respondent expressed
concerns that the Model lends itself to allowing the second line and third line to
assume no accountability for managing first line risk, acting as a detached
“advisors,” rather than acting as true “partners” who learn the “intricacies” of the
first line and share accountability for first line risk management. This respondent
observed a Model in which the intended checks and balances became an
exercise in simply “shifting” accountably for risk management fully to the first line,
rather than all three lines working together with shared accountability to manage
the risk. This respondent describes dynamics between the lines which Davies
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and Zhivitskaya (2018) refer to as the “policy and policing model,” in which the
other lines act as “oversight function[s]” for the first line, rather than acting as
partners (p. 39). This respondent’s feedback reflects a strong preference for the
“partnership model,” which is characterized by highly collaborative relationships
across the lines (Sweeting, 2017, p. 9). The “policy and policing model” and the
“partnership model” each have their own merits, which are explored in Chapter 2.
The next section explores respondents’ insights on interactions across the three
lines, with a focus on challenge, communication, and roles.
Figure 1
Trustworthiness: Ethical Behavior and Efficiency

Interactions Across Lines: Challenge, Communication, and Roles
Respondents provided their feedback on the following statement:
“Professionals across the three lines constructively challenge each other,
identifying and pursuing opportunities to strengthen practices within the banking
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industry.” Seventy-two percent of respondents either “Strongly Agreed” (16%) or
“Agreed” (56%) with the statement. Additional details are reflected in Figure 2.
Respondents underscored the importance of ensuring the three lines remain
“independent” of each other to foster “healthy debate” and to encourage a
heightened level of “diligence” in anticipation of being challenged. Two
respondents who “Somewhat Agreed” felt that lack of collaboration between the
lines hindered meaningful challenge, while one respondent who “Somewhat
Disagreed” cited a lack of understanding about responsibilities across lines and
the structure of the Model itself, precluding meaningful challenge.
Respondents then shared their perspectives on the following statement:
“Clear and meaningful communication consistently takes place between the three
lines.” Forty percent of respondents either “Strongly Agreed” (5%) or “Agreed”
(35%) with the statement, while 42% “Somewhat Agreed.” The remaining 19%
“Somewhat Disagreed” (14%) or “Disagreed” (5%). Additional details are
reflected in Figure 2. A key theme that emerged across respondents’ feedback
was summarized well by one respondent who “Disagreed,” stating that the quality
of communication between the lines “has more to do with the people in the roles,
rather than the Model itself.” One respondent who “Somewhat Agreed” stated the
nature of communication across lines “depends upon the people involved and
how good they are at their job.” Two additional respondents echoed these
sentiments and underscored the essential role management plays in facilitating
meaningful communication between the lines. One respondent who “Agreed”
indicated that the quality of communication was “highly dependent upon the
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management process” for appointing qualified professionals to key roles across
the lines, while another respondent who “Somewhat Agreed” attributed the
quality of communication to the “management styles of those in lead positions.” A
respondent who “Somewhat Disagreed” stated that it was necessary for
executives to “lead by example to reinforce the need to communicate
appropriately.” Kevin Stiroh (Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution
Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) has spoken at
numerous conferences underscoring the importance of organizational culture in
driving trustworthiness in the banking industry—and underscoring the essential
role that industry leaders play in fostering a trustworthy culture. Stiroh’s work on
culture is explored in Chapter 2.
Respondents then provided their feedback on the following statement:
“The division of responsibilities between the three lines is clear, and
professionals demonstrate a commitment to fulfilling those responsibilities (i.e.,
Professionals across all three lines fulfill their responsibilities, so one line does
not need to overcompensate for another line’s lack of commitment to the Model).”
Fifty-six percent of respondents either “Strongly Agreed” (7%) or “Agreed” (49%)
with the statement. Twenty-one percent “Somewhat Agreed,” while 14%
“Somewhat Disagreed,” and 7% “Disagreed”. One key theme that emerged in
respondents’ feedback was that first line professionals were inclined to rely too
heavily on their second line counterparts. Respondents reflected varying
perceptions on how this dynamic develops between the first line and second line.
A respondent who “Agreed” expressed concerns that first line professionals
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sometimes feel that an issue is “no longer [their] problem” once they’ve engaged
the second line. A respondent who “Somewhat Disagreed” felt the first line was
often “over-reliant” on the second line, however this respondent believed both the
first line and the second line shared responsibility for this “over-reliant” dynamic:
The second line “allowed that relationship” to develop with the first line so a
“change in culture” would lead to the “appropriate alignment of responsibilities.”
Another respondent who “Agreed” expressed concerns about adequate first line
engagement, however this respondent felt that lack of first line engagement was
“not motivated by a lack of commitment to upholding responsibilities” but a lack of
understanding that could ultimately be “alleviated by training and conversation”
leading to effective collaboration across lines. One respondent who “Somewhat
Agreed” expressed that “as long as [professionals across lines] stay within their
lanes, collaborate, cooperate, understand and respect each other’s
roles/functions, the Model can be very effective.” Davies and Zhivitskaya (2018)
explore the challenge of establishing the optimal relationship between the first
line and second line, evaluating approaches such as the “partnership model” and
the “policy and policing model” (p. 39). Davies and Zhivitskaya’s research
findings are summarized in Chapter 2. The next section explores respondents’
insights on industry leaders’ understanding of and commitment to the Model.
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Figure 2
Interactions Across Lines: Challenge, Communication, Roles

Leaders: Understanding and Commitment
Respondents provided their feedback on the following statement: “Senior
leaders in the banking industry demonstrate a meaningful understanding of the
Model.” Seventy-two percent of respondents either "Strongly Agreed” (14%) or
“Agreed” (58%) with the statement. Additional details are reflected in Figure 3.
One respondent who “Strongly Agreed” indicated that the Model had become an
industry standard, and leaders had “a very solid understanding of the Model and
its benefits.” Another respondent who “Agreed” echoed sentiments about the
Model being an industry standard, stating that the Model is “embedded enough
now in the industry” that leaders understand it. One respondent who “Strongly
Disagreed” indicated that while senior leaders may have a high-level, theoretical
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appreciation of the Model’s importance, they do not truly understand how the
Model works.
Respondents then shared their perspectives on the following statement:
“Senior leaders in the banking industry demonstrate a commitment to the
successful implementation of the Model by dedicating appropriate human
resources, funding, and employee training to support the Model.” While 72% of
respondents “Strongly Agreed” or “Agreed” that senior leaders understood the
Model, this number dropped to 47% of respondents "Strongly Agreeing” (14%) or
“Agreeing” (33%) that these same leaders demonstrated a commitment to the
successful implementation of the Model. Why would industry leaders with a
meaningful understanding of the Model’s importance not demonstrate
commitment to the successful implementation of the Model? One key theme
emerged: funding. A respondent who “Somewhat Agreed” stated that funding is
“always a challenge” and a respondent who “Disagreed” indicated that
“resourcing is never adequate.” Respondents indicated that one key force does
have the power to drive leaders to allocate increased funding to the Model:
regulatory pressure. Regulators may impose hundreds of millions—or even
billions—of dollars in fines on a bank for engaging in untrustworthy practices
(Benoit, 2020; Hagel & Beckerman, 2020). Industry leaders have a strong
incentive to allocate significant funding to the Three Lines of Defense Model in
order to mitigate the risk of their banks being subject to considerable “monetary
damage as well as reputational damage” resulting from adverse regulatory
findings (Hoes & Gehlert, 2020, p. 159). One respondent who “Somewhat
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Agreed” stated that decisions regarding “resources and funding [for the Model]
are driven by regulator expectations,” and another respondent who “Somewhat
Agreed” indicated that funding for the Model is a direct result of “regulatory
scrutiny.” The next section explores respondents’ insights on the Model’s
greatest strength.
Figure 3
Leaders: Understanding and Commitment

Greatest Strength
When respondents were asked to identify the greatest strength of the
Three Lines of Defense Model, the key theme that emerged was the Model’s
ability to simultaneously foster “collaboration” between the lines, while
maintaining each line’s “independence.” Respondents indicated that
“independence” between the lines is essential for fostering a culture that values
“checks and balances,” “challenge of ideas,” and “accountability.” One
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respondent stated that establishing such a culture “raises the bar for risk
identification and mitigation” which ultimately fosters trustworthiness.
When asked how the Model’s greatest strength could be fostered,
respondents indicated that banking industry leaders must:
•

allocate adequate funding for hiring, to ensure appropriate
resources are dedicated to each line;

•

allocate adequate funding for professionals to engage in ongoing
training on the Model;

•

provide clear guidance on how roles and responsibilities are to be
divided across the lines; and

•

engage in ongoing communication with professionals highlighting
the leaders’ dedication to the Model.

One respondent underscored the importance of leaders maintaining a
“strong tone from the top” and “holding all three lines in equal regard.” This
respondent echoed the sentiments of Kevin Stiroh (2020) who emphasizes that is
the “responsibility [of industry leaders] to set the tone from the top” by “modeling
desired behaviors” (para. 11.) If leaders aspire to foster trustworthiness in their
organizations, they must begin by consistently demonstrating their own
trustworthiness. The next section explores respondents’ insights on the Model’s
greatest weakness.
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Greatest Weakness
When respondents were asked to identify the greatest weakness of the
Three Lines of Defense Model and provide recommendations on how the
weakness could be mitigated, respondents focused on four key areas:
Professionals. The Model is “only as good as its people” so it’s essential
for leaders engaged in the hiring process to make thoughtful “selections of
individuals to fill roles [across the three lines of defense].”
Understanding the Model. Professionals may have “gaps in practical
understanding” of the Model, which could be addressed by leaders
investing in “additional training.”
Lack of Collaboration. Professionals may experience a lack of
collaboration characterized by “poor communication between lines.”
Leaders could address this lack of collaboration by fostering a “culture that
promotes partnership” and the “spirit of cooperation.” It is not adequate for
leaders to simply say they promote “partnership” and “cooperation” across
lines; such values must be at the “core of the corporate culture, such that
leaders breathe it and live it by example.”
Roles and Responsibilities. Professionals across lines may experience
challenges driven by how “roles and responsibilities” are defined by their
bank’s leaders. A key theme that emerged in respondents’ feedback
regarding roles was the importance of leaders defining roles in such a way
that was not excessively “rigid,” while also not going too far in the other
direction and defining roles in a way that was exceedingly “unclear.”
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Respondents expressed that if leaders define roles in an excessively
“rigid” manner, this may lead to “siloing” and a potential “us-versus-them
mentality” developing between the lines. On the other hand, respondents
expressed that if leaders define roles in an “unclear” manner, this may
lead to an “overlap of activities,” ultimately fostering “contentious”
relationships between the lines. Concerns expressed by respondents
about the complexity of establishing “roles and responsibilities” across the
lines are echoed throughout the literature. Held (2018) strongly advises
against implementing the Model too “rigidly” which can result in barriers, or
“silos,” developing between the lines (paras. 9-13). Hu and Denizkurdu
(2020) emphasize the importance of leaders clearly establishing “unique
roles and responsibilities” across the lines in order to avoid “unnecessary
duplications” of work (p. 215). The next section explores respondents’
closing feedback regarding the Model.
Closing Feedback
The final survey question invited respondents to provide any additional
feedback they’d like to share about their experiences working within the Three
Lines of Defense Model. The key message that emerged is that the Three Lines
of Defense Model serves as a highly effective framework for driving
trustworthiness in the banking industry—however, the Model’s efficacy is
squarely dependent on the professionals implementing the Model. As one
respondent commented, “The three lines of defense are made up of people [and]
a chain is as strong as its weakest link.” Another respondent indicated that the
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Three Lines of Defense Model is “a strong model” but only “when it is properly
administered, resourced, and managed.” These sentiments were echoed by a
respondent who characterized the Model’s efficacy as being “highly dependent
on individuals in the roles, but equally important is the mutual respect for each
role and a collaborative work environment.” The respondent goes on to warn that
“without collaboration and respect for different perspectives” between
professionals across lines, the “integrity” of the Three Lines of Defense Model is
“in jeopardy.”
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In the process of conducting this research, insights have emerged from
the literature and survey responses that have provided me with enhanced clarity
on the meaning of trustworthiness, the importance of trustworthiness, and the
role the Three Lines of Defense Model plays in fostering trustworthiness in the
banking industry. While the survey yields valuable insights, I view the unbalanced
pool of respondents as its key limitation. Due to the use of snowball sampling,
the population of survey respondents closely resembles the population of my
professional network: predominantly first line and second line professionals
within G-SIBs. In future research, meaningful insights could be gained by
gathering survey feedback from an equal number of respondents from each line
of defense, as well as an equal number of respondents from G-SIBs and non-GSIBs. Findings from such a survey would facilitate the comparison of
perspectives across lines, and across G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs. In this final
chapter, I summarize key takeaways from my research.
What is Trustworthiness?
Trustworthiness is comprised of two essential characteristics: integrity and
competence (Dia, 2011). “Integrity” is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as
“the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles that you refuse to
change.” “Competence” is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as the “ability to
do something well.” It’s not adequate for bank employees to behave with
integrity; employees must also possess the competence to protect customers
from harm, such as loss of assets entrusted to the bank. Three lines of defense
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professionals must challenge each other and challenge their bank’s established
practices as a method for identifying opportunities to consistently foster both
integrity and competence.
Why is Trustworthiness Important?
When examining the importance of trustworthiness in banking, three key
perspectives emerged in my research: (a) global perspective; (b) bank-specific
perspective; and (c) individual perspective. The global perspective of
trustworthiness focuses on the role G-SIBs play in the banking industry. While
trustworthiness is vital for all banks, there is a small subset of banks whose
trustworthiness—or lack thereof—carries significant global consequences: GSIBs. G-SIBs are “institutions of such size, market importance, and global
interconnectedness that their distress or failure would cause…adverse economic
consequences across a range of countries” (FSB, 2020, para. 1; FSB, 2010, p.
2). The enduring trustworthiness of G-SIBs is essential for maintaining global
economic stability. The bank-specific perspective of trustworthiness focuses on
the ways in which trustworthy practices are essential for the success of a given
bank. Regulators may impose hundreds of millions—or even billions—of dollars
in fines on a bank for engaging in untrustworthy practices (Benoit, 2020; Hagel &
Beckerman, 2020). Industry leaders have a strong incentive to foster
trustworthiness in their respective banks, in order to mitigate the risk of their
banks being subject to considerable “monetary damage as well as reputational
damage” due to adverse regulatory findings (Hoes & Gehlert, 2020, p. 159). The
individual perspective of trustworthiness focuses on the ways in which individuals
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are directly impacted by their bank’s trustworthiness. Due to untrustworthy
practices at Wells Fargo, many customers—and individuals who rely on those
customers—were adversely impacted. Samir Hanef was one such customer
whose car was repossessed due to Wells Fargo’s untrustworthy practices and
consequently, he was unable to commute to his job as a social worker, resulting
in his patients failing to receive much-needed services (Egan, 2017). Hanef’s
credit score had been so damaged by the repossession of his car, that he was no
longer eligible to refinance his mortgage (Egan, 2017). As a customer, Hanef
was directly impacted by his bank’s untrustworthy behavior, and individuals who
rely on Hanef—namely his patients and his family—were also personally
impacted (Egan, 2017). The global perspective, bank-specific perspective, and
individual perspective converge on the conclusion that trustworthiness is an
absolutely essential component of a thriving banking industry and a thriving
global economy.
Does the Three Lines of Defense Model Foster Trustworthiness?
While the Three Lines of Defense Model serves as an effective framework
for fostering trustworthiness in the banking industry, the Model is certainly no
silver bullet. When examining key factors that drive the efficacy of the Model, two
key themes emerged in my research: (a) implementation; and (b) culture. There
is no one-size-fits-all approach to the optimal implementation of the Model, and
leaders must carefully evaluate a bank’s “nature, size…complexity…[and] risk
profile” in order to determine how the Model can best be implemented to align to
a bank’s unique characteristics (BCBS, 2011, p. 3). While the general structure of
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the Model is well-established within the industry, there is a “tricky balance to be
achieved” when dividing responsibilities between the three lines (Hoes & Gehlert,
2020, p. 159). Excessively rigid implementation of the Model can inhibit effective
communication between professionals across lines, while excessively vague
implementation of the Model can result in confusion regarding the division of
responsibilities across lines. Even if the Model is successfully implemented in a
way that is ideal for a bank at a given point in time, the Model’s implementation
will require ongoing re-evaluations and adjustments, as the bank’s risk landscape
evolves (Hu & Denizkurdu, 2020, p. 220).
The Model’s efficacy is dependent on the prevailing culture of a bank.
Employees’ “observations about leaders” act as a key force in shaping an
organization’s culture, which is why it is essential for leaders to demonstrate their
commitment to operating in a trustworthy manner (Stiroh, 2018, p. 3). Banks with
cultures that do not value trustworthiness are characterized by widespread
“groupthink” and employees who raise concerns about high-risk behavior in such
institutions are routinely ignored by senior leaders (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1). Such
banks suffer reputational damage themselves, while also diminishing overall
“trustworthiness of the industry over time” (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1). Banks with
cultures that value trustworthiness are characterized by employees’
unwillingness to engage in excessive risk-taking, employees’ commitment to
behaving lawfully, and senior managers’ commitment to encouraging employees
to escalate risk-related concerns (Stiroh, 2020, p. 1). Banks with cultures that
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value trustworthiness earn reputations as trustworthy institutions and foster
overall trustworthiness in the banking industry.
What’s Next?
The banking industry’s trustworthiness—or untrustworthiness—has the
power to positively or adversely impact the lives of individuals and the power to
enhance or diminish the stability of the global economy (Dia, 2011; Egan, 2017;
FSB, 2010). Three lines of defense professionals have an opportunity, and an
obligation, to foster trustworthiness in the banking industry by meaningfully
challenging each other and their bank’s established practices. Industry leaders
have an opportunity, and an obligation, to empower three lines of defense
professionals to foster trustworthiness by investing in hiring, retaining talent
across the lines, and actively fostering a culture that values trustworthy behavior.
Every employee across every bank has an opportunity, and an obligation, to
approach their work in a trustworthy manner every day. Survey respondents in
this study consistently echoed one sentiment with especially strong conviction:
The Three Lines of Defense Model, and ultimately the banking industry, is only
as good as its people.
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APPENDIX

Recruitment Flyer

Recruitment Script
My name is Nicole Kruman and I am a graduate student at the University of
Pennsylvania in the Organizational Dynamics program. To fulfill my program
requirements, I am completing my capstone research project, which explores the
role of the Three Lines of Defense Model in contributing to a culture of
trustworthiness in the banking industry (Cocheo, 2014; Lim et al., 2017). I will
conduct this research through the analysis of survey results, academic literature,
industry white papers, and regulators’ publications.
I am personally drawn to this research because of my role in the First Line of
Defense within a G-SIB (Global Systemically Important Bank). I am surveying
professionals who work (or have previously worked) in the Three Lines of
Defense within the banking industry because I am especially interested in
analyzing their first-hand experiences. While there is academic literature, industry
white papers, and regulators’ publications on the Model, my research objective is
to integrate theoretical and practical research as a whole (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 2014; Lim et al., 2017; Daisley et al., 2015).
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A trustworthy banking industry is an absolutely vital component to a thriving
global economy (Dia, 2011). By analyzing the results of this survey, I hope to
identify ways in which the Model can be leveraged more effectively to contribute
to a culture of trustworthiness in the industry. In addition to closed-ended
questions, this survey provides several open-ended text boxes. I encourage you
to share your feedback in these text boxes, so I can more fully understand your
experiences and insights.
To participate in this 20-minute confidential survey you must currently work (or
have previously worked) in the Three Lines of Defense Model within the banking
industry. The survey does not require you to disclose any aspect of your personal
identity or that of your employer. Should you choose to disclose any identifying
information about yourself or your employer in your responses to open-ended
questions, this identifying information will not be referred to in any way during the
course of my research. No one other than myself will have access to your survey
and all related information will be stored on my password-protected computer.
I will be completing this research under the guidance of Dr. Kimberly Torres at
the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Torres is a faculty member in the
Organizational Dynamics program.
If you are interested in participating in my study, please complete this 20-minute
confidential survey: [Qualtrics Survey Link]
If you’re interested in learning more about this study, please feel free to email me
at nicolekr@sas.upenn.edu.
Thank you for your participation. Your contribution to this research study is truly
appreciated.
Participant Consent Form
By consenting to be part of this research, you agree to participate in a 20-minute
survey. This is a research study; therefore, there will be no direct benefits to you
from participation in the study. It is hoped that the findings of this study will
provide some understanding of the role of the Three Lines of Defense Model in
contributing to a culture of trustworthiness in the banking industry. Your
participation is completely voluntary.
The survey does not require you to disclose any aspect of your personal identity
or that of your employer. Should you choose to disclose any identifying
information about yourself or your employer in your responses to open-ended
questions, this identifying information will not be referred to in any way during the
course of my research. Should I plan to continue this study at a later date, the
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data from this research will be de-identified, and could be stored and distributed
for future research.
There are minimal risks to you from taking part in this survey. The risk is
accidental disclosure of private information. However, every effort will be made,
within the limits of the law, to safeguard the confidentiality of the information you
provide. No one other than myself, Nicole Kruman, will have access to the
information on your survey. No identifying information related to respondents will
be referenced at any point in time throughout the course of this research. All
related information will be stored on my password-protected computer.
Should I plan to continue this study at a later date, the data from this research
will be de-identified, and could be stored and distributed for future research. You
may choose not to answer any question that you do not want to answer and are
free to terminate the survey at any time. Should you decide to terminate your
survey and/or involvement in this study, I will destroy all related information. You
will not be linked to my research in any way thereafter. You understand that all
information collected in this study will be kept strictly confidential, except as may
be required by law. Because of the confidential nature of the research, there will
be no witness to consent procedures.
Subject Rights: If you wish to have further information regarding your rights as a
research subject, you may contact the Director of Regulatory Affairs at the
University of Pennsylvania by telephoning 215-898-2614. You have been given
the opportunity to ask questions and have had the answered to your satisfaction.
You have read and understand this consent form.

o I consent to participate in this study
o I do not consent to participate in this study

(Skip to end of survey if “I do not consent to participate in this study” is selected)
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Survey

1) Do you currently work (or have you ever worked) in the Three Lines of
Defense Model within the banking industry?

o Yes
o No

(Skip to end of survey if “No” is selected)

2) How many years have you worked in the First Line of Defense (Line of
Business), including your current role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+
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3) How many years have you worked in the Second Line of Defense
(Compliance), including your current role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+

4) How many years have you worked in the Second Line of Defense (Risk),
including your current role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+
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5) How many years have you worked in the Third Line of Defense (Internal
Audit), including your current role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+

6) How many years have you worked as an External Auditor, including your
current role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+
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7) How many years have you worked as a Regulator, including your current
role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+

8) If you have worked in a role in the Three Lines of Defense Model within
the Banking Industry, however the role was not described in any of the
previous questions, please describe the role.
(Skip to question 10, if question 8 is empty)

9) How many years have you worked in the role you described in the
previous question, including your current role if applicable?

o0
o <1
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11-20
o 21+
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10)If you are currently working in the Three Lines of Defense Model, what is
your current role?

o First Line (Line of Business)
o Second Line (Compliance)
o Second Line (Risk)
o Third Line (Internal Audit)
o External Audit
o Regulator
o Not Currently Working in the Three Lines of Defense Model
o Current Role is Not Described in the Options Provided
(Skip to question 12 if “Current Role is Not Described in the Options
Provided” is *not* selected)

11)If you currently work in a role in the Three Lines of Defense Model within
the Banking Industry, however the role was not described in the options
provided in the previous question, please describe the role.

12)How many banks have you been employed by which implemented the
Model, including your current employer if applicable?

o1
o2
o3
o4
o 5+
o N/A (e.g., Regulators, External Auditors)
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(Display question 13 if the answer to question 12 is *not* “N/A”)

13)Is your current employer a bank?

o Yes
o No

(Skip to question 15 if answer to Question 13 is “No”)
(Display question 14 if the answer to question 13 is “Yes”)

14)Is your current employer a Global Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB) or
a bank that is *not* a G-SIB? (For a list of G-SIBs, please refer to this
page: https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P111120.pdf)

o G-SIB
o *Not* a G-SIB

(Display question 15 if the answer to question 12 is *not* “N/A”)

15)Have you previously been employed by a Global Systemically Important
Bank (G-SIB)? (For a list of G-SIBs, please refer to this page:
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P111120.pdf)

o Yes
o No

16)Have you previously been employed by a bank that is *not* a Global

Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB)? (For a list of G-SIBs, please refer to
this page: https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P111120.pdf)

o Yes
o No
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17)What are the key differences you've observed in the implementation of the
Model at different banks that have led to more effective (or less effective)
results?

18)Overall, the Model contributes to making the banking industry more

trustworthy in terms of functioning more efficiently (e.g., more effective
controls are in place and mistakes are minimized due to the Model).

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree

19)Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.

20)Overall, the Model contributes to making the banking industry more

trustworthy in terms of ethical behavior. (e.g., a culture with high ethical
standards is established and unethical behavior is minimized due to the
Model).

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree
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21)Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.

22)Professionals across the Three Lines constructively challenge each other,
identifying and pursuing opportunities to strengthen practices within the
banking industry.

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree

23)Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.

24)Clear and meaningful communication consistently takes place between
the Three Lines.

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree
25) Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.
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26)The division of responsibilities between the Three Lines is clear, and

professionals demonstrate a commitment to fulfilling those responsibilities.
(i.e., Professionals across all three lines fulfill their responsibilities, so one
line does not need to overcompensate for another line’s lack of
commitment to the Model.)

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree
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27)Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.

28)Senior leaders in the banking industry demonstrate a meaningful
understanding of the Model.

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree

29) Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.

30)Senior leaders in the banking industry demonstrate a commitment to the

successful implementation of the Model by dedicating appropriate human
resources, funding, and employee training to support the Model.

o Strongly Agree
o Agree
o Somewhat Agree
o Somewhat Disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly Disagree
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31) Please describe the experience (or experiences) that inform your answer
to the previous question.

32)The Model's greatest strength is:
33)This strength could be fostered by:
34)The Model's greatest weakness is:
35)This weakness could be mitigated by:
36)Is there anything else you would like to share about your experiences
working within the Three Lines of Defense Model?

